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Abstract. Privacy preserving querying and data publishing has been studied in the
context of statistical databases and statistical disclosure control. Recently, large-scale data
collection and integration efforts increased privacy concerns which motivated data mining
researchers to investigate privacy implications of data mining and how data mining can
be performed without violating privacy. In this paper, we first provide an overview of
privacy preserving data mining focusing on distributed data sources, then we compare two
technologies used in privacy preserving data mining. The first technology is encryption-
based, and it is used in earlier approaches. The second technology is secret-sharing which
is recently being considered as a more efficient approach.
1 Introduction
With the popularity of Internet, it is now extremely easy to collect person-specific
data which can also be linked to other data sets. Ubiquitous devices such as RFID
tags and readers and GPS equipped mobile phones increased the privacy concerns
as well, since they made it possible to collect location information about people.
But the turning point was the 9-11 events after which US government increased
its nation-wide data collection and integration efforts in the name of “fight against
terrorism.” In fact, some of the largest airline companies in the US, including
American, United and Northwest, turned over millions of passenger records to the
FBI according to NY Times. Such scandals proved that privacy risks are real.
Privacy breaches could also be accidental as in the case of the AOL scandal. AOL
released the “de-identified” search logs of its 650.000 customers over a 3 month
period in August 2006. AOL realized its mistake and removed the data, but is was
already downloaded by many users, and in fact an individual was being identified
from her query logs.
Data mining is motivated by the large-scale data collection efforts by compa-
nies and government organizations with the aim of turning massive amounts of raw
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data into useful information. Machine learning, Artificial Intelligence, Statistics,
and Databases are utilized in data mining in order to come up with data-centric
techniques for extracting models from massive data collections. The extracted mod-
els could be in many forms, such as rules, patterns, or decision trees. Most of
the profitable applications of data mining concerns humans. Therefore a consider-
able proportion of the collected data is about people and their activities. This is
why data mining and privacy discussions are inseparable now. In fact some data
mining projects were not funded due to privacy concerns. According to Computer
World [21], “The chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security has asked
Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff to provide a detailed
listing of all IT programs that have been canceled, discontinued or modified because
of privacy concerns.” In response to such privacy concerns, data mining researchers
started working on methods for preserving privacy when doing data mining. Tech-
niques were developed for different data mining models, starting from classification
models, then association rules and clustering for distributed scenarios.
The research efforts on privacy preserving data mining at European level were
supported by two large scale projects funded by Future and Emerging Technologies
of Information Society Technologies under the 6th Framework. One of the projects is
Geographic Privacy-aware Knowledge Discovery and Delivery (GeoPKDD), and the
other is Knowledge Discovery in Ubiquitous Computing (KdUbiq). These projects
have different purposes but they are both concentrated on new data mining technolo-
gies and their privacy implications. GeoPKDD is a research project concentrating on
spatio-temporal knowledge discovery, and privacy issues in spatio-temporal knowl-
edge discovery. KdUbiq aims at creating a community in the area of ubiquitous
knowledge discovery which will define the area and research directions. One of the
working groups is privacy and security in ubiquitous computing.
In this paper we are going to concentrate on privacy preserving data mining
in distributed environments and discuss two classes of techniques, namely the en-
cryption based and recently introduced secret sharing based techniques for privacy
preserving data mining.
2 Overview and State-of-the-art
In this section we summarize the pioneering work on privacy preserving data min-
ing which shaped the research in this field. Two concurrent papers published in
2000 by researchers from different groups used the title “Privacy Preserving Data
Mining”[3, 14]. Although the titles were the same, their approach and problem set-
ting was different. The authors of [3] assumed that the data mining effort will be
outsourced to a third party. Before the data could be handed over to a third party
the confidential values in the database, such as the salary of employees, needed to
be perturbed in a way that the original probability distribution could be estimated
from the perturbed data but not the original data values. This way, a decision tree
can still be constructed from the perturbed data within a certain error margin that
the authors approve. The authors in [14] assume that there are two parties with
private data sources who would like to do data mining without seeing each other’s
data and propose cryptographic techniques to achieve that. They also demonstrated
their approach on decision tree construction.
In distributed data mining one or more data holders provide the input data for
the data mining, while one or more data miners cooperate in performing the data
mining. A simple way to perform distributed data mining is to send all data to one
data miner, and let the data miner perform the data mining. If the data contains
private information such an approach clearly violates privacy, since the data miner
will have full access to all data. In such a distributed environment it is thus not
enough to ensure that the result of the data mining preserves privacy, we must also
guarantee that privacy is not breached during the computation itself. Kantarcioglu
and Clifton developed protocols to privately mine for association rules in a dis-
tributed environment[12]. The authors considered a case in which there are multiple
parties that have their own confidential local databases that they do not want to
share with others. The assumption is that the data is distributed horizontally, i.e.,
the database schema is the same for all the parties. The individual association rules
together and their statistical properties were assumed to be confidential. Another
assumption is that the involved parties are honest but curious, i.e., they follow the
protocol but they would like to get as much information as possible from the data
they receive. Under these assumptions, secure multi-part computation base proto-
cols were employed based on commutative encryption schemes to make sure that
the confidential association rules are circulated among the participating companies
in encrypted form. The resulting global association rules can then be obtained in
a private manner without each company knowing which rule belongs to which local
database.
When data is going to be published, or handed over to a third party, it needs
to be sanitized by removing sensitive information. This sensitive information could
be some data values or it could be in the form of data mining models. In [2], the
authors propose an approach for privacy preserving data mining which maps the
original data set into a new anonymized data set preserving the correlations among
the different dimensions.
Security of random perturbation methods against partial disclosure through suc-
cessive querying of the database by snoopers is studied in [17]. The effect of high
dimensionality in randomisation was studied by Aggarwal in [1]. In the work by Liu
et al. the authors point out that perturbation techniques which preserve distance
between data objects can be attacked if the attacker knows a small set of data se-
lected according to the same probability distribution as the original data set[15, 16].
The attack applies principal component analysis to the perturbed data and tries to
fit it to the known data set. Liu et al. also propose an alternative transformation
where the objects in the original data set are projected onto a subspace in a way
that distance is preserved with high probability. They point out that the alternative
approach is secure against the identified attack, but may not be secure against other
attacks.
3 Encryption-based Techniques
Research in privacy preserving data mining started after 2000, but the cryptographic
background dates back to Yao’s definition and solution to the “millionaires problem”
in 1982[22]. In Yao’s millionaires problem two millionaires want to find out who is
richer, but without revealing their wealth to the each other. In fact, the ability to
compare numerical data is crucial in most data mining tasks. Yao’s work initiated
research in secure multi-party computation which is the study of the class of functions
which two or more players can securely compute on their joint inputs. This is done
in a way that nothing but the final result of the computation will be revealed to
the parties. In particular, no party will know the inputs of the other parties. Yao
later on demonstrated that any problem which can be described by a polynomial
size boolean circuit of logarithmic depth can be solved securely[23]. Today we know
that any computation which can be done in polynomial time by one party can be
done securely by multiple parties[5]. The only ingredient needed in these generic
protocols is encryption.
An important issue in secure multi-party computation is the definition of security.
What does it mean that “the protocol for computing function f does not reveal too
much”? Intuitively we would like our protocols to be as if all players send their
inputs to an honest third party, which performs the computation and returns the
results to the players. This perfect protocol is clearly secure, since no player sees
anything else than its own inputs and outputs (in multi-party computation we do
not address the privacy issues of the input itself). A formalisation of this idea is the
standard definition of secure computation used today[10]. The definition requires
the existence of a simulator which can generate the state of any (possibly dishonest)
party at each step of the protocol when given the inputs and outputs of the party
in the protocol. The simulated state should be such that it is not computationally
feasible to tell the difference between the simulated state of the dishonest participant,
and the state of the participant in a real invocation of the protocol.
Some of the well-known public-key encryption schemes are RSA and ElGamal.
RSA encrypts messages of approximately 1024 bits in ciphertexts of 1024 bits. El-
Gamal is an elliptic curve based encryption which can handle messages (typically
around 160 bits) that are much smaller than what RSA can handle. Public key
encryption schemes are easier to use and administrate, but are slower than the so
called symmetric key encryption schemes. DES and AES are well known symmetric
key encryption schemes. They encrypt messages of 64 and 128 bits respectively, and
generate ciphertexts of the same length.
3.1 Circuit Evaluation
Many of the protocols based on encryption use the idea introduced by Yao[23]. In
Yao’s protocol one of the parties compute a scrambled version of a boolean circuit
for evaluating the desired function. The scrambled circuit consists of encryptions of
all possible bit values on all possible wires in the circuit. The number of encryptions
is approximately 4m, where m is the number of gates in the circuit. The encryptions
can be symmetric key encryption, which has a typical ciphertext-length of 64 bits.
The scrambled circuit is sent to the other party, which can then evaluate the circuit
to get the final result. These approaches are, in general, expensive since they require
complicated encryptions for each individual bit.
Many privacy preserving data mining protocols use the idea of scrambled circuits,
but in order to limit the overhead of scrambled circuits, they only use scrambled
circuits as sub-protocols to compute certain simple functions[14, 20].
3.2 Homomorphic Encryption
A powerful tool in computing a wide range of functions with computational security
is homomorphic encryption. With homomorphic encryption we can avoid the bit-
wise encryption from the scrambled circuits described in Section 3.1. Homomorphic
encryption schemes are a special class of public key encryption schemes. The first
homomorphic cryptosystem, called the Goldwasser-Micali (GM) cryptosystem, was
proposed in 1984[11]. Due to its prohibitive message expansion during encryption
(i.e. each bit of plaintext is encrypted as a ciphertext of eat least 1024 bits), it is
not practical for data mining applications. The natural extension of the GM cryp-
tosystem is the Benaloh cryptosystem [21], which allows the encryption of larger
block sizes at a time. Although the message expansion is not as bad as in the GM
cryptosystem, it is still not suitable for data mining applications. Furthermore, the
fact that the decryption is based on exhaustive search over all possible plain-texts
also makes the Benaloh cryptosystem unpractical for privacy preserving data min-
ing. A more recent scheme is the Paillier cryptosystem [18], which avoids many of
the drawbacks of the earlier homomorphic cryptosystems. The Paillier cryptosys-
tem provides fast encryption and decryption algorithms, and it encrypts 1024-bit
messages in ciphertexts of at least 2048-bits, which is reasonable if we work with
large plaintexts.
Homomorphic encryption enables us to compute certain functions more efficiently
compared to scrambled circuits. The authors of [9] use homomorphic encryption
for computing secure scalar products used in privacy preserving data mining. The
protocol is shown in Fig. 1, where two players, A and B, compute the scalar product
of vectors v = (v1, . . . , vd), and w = (w1, . . . , wd), such that only B learns the scalar
product, and A learns nothing at all.
A B
E(w1), . . . , E(wd)ff
c =
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i=1E(wi)
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-
Figure 1: Computationally secure scalar product protocol (D(c) = v · w).
4 Secret Sharing
Secret sharing was introduced independently by Shamir[19] and Blakley[7] in 1979.
The idea is that one party has a secret which it distributes among n other parties
in a way that none of the n parties alone can recover the secret. As a matter of fact
the secret is shared in a way that the information of at least t of the n parties is
needed to recover the secret, where t is a predefined threshold. Any attempt by less
than t parties to recover the secret will fail and they will not learn anything about
the secret.
A (t, n) secret sharing scheme is a set of two functions S and R. The function
S is a sharing function and takes a secret s as input and creates n secret shares :
S(s) = (s1, . . . , sn). The two functions are selected in a way that, for any set
I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of t indices R(I, sI1 , . . . , sIt) = s. Furthermore we require that it is
impossible to recover s from a set of t− 1 secret shares. A secret sharing scheme is
additively homomorphic if R(I, sI1 + s
′
I1
, . . . , sIt + s
′
It) = s+ s
′.
A very simple (n, n) additive secret sharing scheme is S(s) = (r1, . . . , rn−1, r),
where ri is random for i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, and r = s − ∑n−1i=1 ri. To recover s all
secret shares are added: s = r+
∑n−1
i=1 ri. If even one secret share is missing nothing
is known about s.
Shamir secret sharing was used by Ben-Or et al. [6] in 1988 to show that any
function of n inputs can be computed by n parties such that no coalition of less
than n/3 of the parties can gain any additional information about the honest par-
ties inputs (even if they do not behave according to the prescribed algorithm). If
we assume that all parties behave semi-honestly (i.e. they follow the protocol), then
no coalition of less than n/2 of the parties can gain any information about the in-
puts of the honest parties. The protocol uses the additively homomorphic property
of Shamir secret sharing. The idea is that addition and multiplication together is
enough to evaluate any function (in particular addition and multiplication over Z2
is a universal set of boolean operations). The bottleneck of the algorithm in [6] is
multiplication. Since Shamir secret sharing is not multiplicatively homomorphic, in
order to perform a multiplication, a special “degree reduction step” has to be per-
formed. This degree reduction requires that all parties secret share a new number
(a total of n2 new messages for each multiplication). For most data-mining applica-
tions this degree reduction step is too costly, since a vast number of multiplications
is common. Another limitation of the generic multi party computation based on
secret sharing is when some parties may behave dishonestly. They may try to gain
extra information by deviating from the prescribed protocol. To avoid this, a special
variant of secret sharing is used. This variant, called verifiable secret sharing adds
extra information to each secret share, such that any set of players, at any time in
the protocol, can verify that the shares they have are consistent. Both the extra in-
formation in the secret shares, and the interaction required to verify a secret sharing
adds extra communication overhead to the protocols.
4.1 The Coopetative Model
Data holders that participate in distributed data mining have naturally an interest
in the result of the data mining. They are, however, understandably reluctant to
share their private data with others to either protect their interests or meet privacy
requirements imposed by authorities and/or clients. Data holders, in other words,
are ready to cooperate with each other to extract useful information from combined
data while competition among them dictates that individual data is not revealed to
others.
The term coopetation is used in economics to refer to cooperation between com-
peting entities to improve the overall value of their market. This is quite similar to
the distributed data mining scenario where data holders behave with similar moti-
vations. In the coopetative model data holders provide inputs to a relatively small
set of data mining servers or so called third parties, which are assumed semi-honest
(i.e. they are honest but curious; they follow the protocol steps, but are interested
in any leaked information). Some of the data holders can actively participate in the
distributed data mining playing the role of third parties. The non-collusion property
must be satisfied by certain sets of third parties. At the end of the protocol the data
miner, which can be either a separate entity or one of the data holders, will have
the outcome as an output.
Some of the benefits of the coopetative model are:
• Very efficient data mining protocols can be constructed.
• The major workload can be put on a small set of dedicated servers which are
better protected and regulated.
• Only these small sets of servers need to posses the necessary hardware, software
and know-how to perform data mining.
• Encryption is avoided, thus key distribution and other problems related with
encryption are no longer an issue.
The basic version of the coopetative model [13] requires two dedicated third
parties and a miner. Data holders secret shares their data and send each share to
one of the third parties. For sake of simplicity we can assume that the private input
of each data holder is an integer x and the data holder creates two shares r and
x − r where r is a randomly selected integer. The share r is sent to the first third
party and the share x− r is sent to the other. Clearly both shares are random when
observed alone and no single entity (adversary, third party, or miner) can obtain
any information about the private input x. The private input can only be revealed
when two shares are put together, which never happens in the coopetative model.
The third parties work on the individual shares and compute algebraic operations
such as numerical difference and comparison on the shares, which are the fundamen-
tal operations in many data mining applications (e.g. constructing decision trees,
association rule mining and clustering). The result of these operations are the shares
of the final outcome of the computation, which can be obtained only by the data
miner.
In order for the third parties to work on shares, they need to employ secret sharing
schemes which are homomorphic with respect to the operations they perform. For
instance, additive secret sharing described above is homomorphic with respect to
addition (and subtraction): adding shares pairwise gives an additive sharing of the
sum of the secrets. Therefore, the additive secret sharing scheme can directly be
used in numerical difference operations in clustering algorithms.
5 Discussion and Comparison
When comparing the efficiency of two alternative protocols for a specific task there
are three factors to consider: the computation cost, communication cost, and the
number of rounds in the protocols. We will compare encryption-based techniques
and secret sharing with respect to these three factors in the following.
Public key encryption schemes are (by definition) based on computationally diffi-
cult problems, and thus require expensive operations such as modular exponentiation
of large numbers (in the order of 1000 bits). In contrast it is very efficient to compute
secret shares when using e.g. Shamir secret sharing or the simple additive secret
sharing described in Section 4. Sharing a secret with Shamir secret sharing consists
in choosing a random polynomial and evaluating it in n points. The polynomial is
chosen over the same field as the secret, which means that usually all computations
are done with ordinary integers.
As mentioned in Section 3 public key encryption schemes create ciphertexts of
at least 1024 bits (with the exception of Elliptic curve based encryption schemes).
If we want to use the homomorphic properties of an encryption scheme we have to
encrypt each input in it’s own ciphertext. Often this will mean that we encrypt
32-bit numbers in 1024 bits (giving an overhead of 32). If we use circuit evaluation
techniques we are forced to encrypt each bit as at least 160 bits if we use elliptic
curve cryptography. In contrast, secret sharing creates n shares of each input, where
each share is of the same size as the secret. We thus always have an overhead of n.
Note, however, that some secret sharing schemes, like the Asmuth Bloom scheme[4],
create shares which are larger than the secret.
If Shamir secret sharing is used as described in Section 4 each multiplication
requires that each pair of parties exchange information. Having to wait for the
transmission of these messages at each multiplication clearly slows down a protocol,
in comparison Yao’s circuit evaluation only requires one round of communication.
Some work has been done to minimise the number of rounds needed by secret sharing
based techniques[8], though they do not give constant round complexity as in the
case of Yao’s protocol. It is still an open problem to fully classify the problems
which can be solved with a constant number of rounds with unconditional security.
We should note that not all problems can be solved with unconditional security.
A very important fact, from a data mining point of view, is that unconditionally
secure scalar products between two parties is impossible. Any two-party data mining
algorithm which applies scalar products (between secret vectors held by the two
parties) has to rely on either encryption based techniques, or external parties.
6 Conclusion
Privacy preserving data mining is an ongoing research area and there are a lot of
issues that needs to be addressed. First of all, the databases that are collected
for mining are huge, and scalable techniques for privacy preserving data mining
are needed to handle these data sources. Secret sharing based methods can be
considered one step forward in scalable privacy preserving data mining. The degree
of data distribution could also be a problem when we consider a grid, peer-to-peer,
or ubiquitous computing environments. Techniques which minimize the amount of
computation and data transfer are needed in highly distributed environments. New
data types such as spatio-temporal data collected by location-based services, and
other mobile service providers pose new types of threats to privacy, and existing
techniques for privacy preserving data mining may not be adequate to handle these
types of data.
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